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SOCIAL JUSTICE ON THE MARGINS: THE FUTURE OF THE NOT FOR PROFIT 
SECTOR AS PROVIDERS OF LEGAL ADVICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
Hilary Sommerlad1 
Birmingham Law School 
Peter Sanderson 
University of Huddersfield 
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (LASPO) has been described by many 
commentators as a dramatic curtailment of access to justice which is likely to impact disproportionately 
on marginalised groups and individuals.  This paper seeks to set LASPO in its historical context -  as a 
radical development, but nevertheless one that is consistent with the policy discourses of 
responsibilization and consumerism dominant from the 1990s.  It uses research into the experience of 
the Not For Profit sector’s involvement in legally aided welfare advice to frame this perspective.  Key 
findings include the extent to which respondents (both managers and front line workers) felt that Legal 
Services Commission funding had transformed organizational practices and ethos but that the 
implementation of LASPO and the austerity programme represented a critical watershed for the sector 
and its capacity to fulfil what front line workers in particular felt was their ‘mission’. 
 
Keywords: NFP Sector; legal aid; responsibilization; access to justice; Big Society 
 
Introduction 
The involvement of what is variously described as the Not for Profit (NFP), 
Voluntary or Third Sector in the provision of legal advice and assistance is paralleled by its 
broader engagement in welfare provision as a whole (Kendall, 2003; Kelly, 2007): a history 
of charitable or grant-aided provision in the interstices of the post-war welfare settlement was 
transformed from the 1980s onwards by an increasingly close relationship with government 
and a shift towards the contracted provision of direct services (Fenton, Passey and Hems, 
1991; Bourn, 2005; NCVO 2005, 2008).  For government and the Legal Aid Board, and its 
successor body the Legal Services Commission (LSC), the primary attraction of this 
relationship lay in local and national advice agencies’ specialist expertise in areas of welfare 
law, such as housing and debt (LCD 1995, paras 3.7-3.8), which had come to be viewed both 
as areas of unmet legal need (Genn, 1999) and as contributing disproportionately to social 
exclusion (DCA 2001; Pleasence et al., 2006).  The sector’s appeal was enhanced by the 
perception that it offered both cheaper provision and a set of altruistic values that contrasted 
with the rent-seeking behaviour assumed to be characteristic of private solicitors’ firms.  
Another factor, reflecting the appeal of communitarian ideas for both Conservatives and 
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Labour (Sage 2012), was the ‘added value’ in the form of social capital which the sector was 
expected to bring. 
 
The high water mark of the sector’s engagement in the provision of publicly funded 
legal advice was the period following the Labour Government’s Access to Justice Act 1999 
(AJA), and the creation of the LSC and Community Legal Service.2 However, a developing 
governmental discourse which constructed legal aid expenditure as a problem requiring 
radical solutions (Falconer 2007, cited in Sanderson and Sommerlad 2011), led to a cooling of 
mutual regard (Sommerlad and Sanderson 2009).  The relationship has now reached a critical 
watershed as a result of the hegemony of the ‘Big Society/ small state’ discourse, and   
implementation of the austerity programme which includes the enactment of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO).   Although rhetoric which 
described LASPO as the ‘end of legal aid as we know it’ might be exaggerated (Miller, 2012), 
it is nevertheless clear that in combination with the decline in other funding sources, its 
impact  on the NFP sector and its clients will be drastic. 
 
That this should occur just as the financial crisis has also exacerbated for most legal 
aid recipients the clusters of problems that the AJA 1999 was designed to address might 
appear a bitter irony, but our argument is that it is in fact far from coincidental.   The 
statistical picture on current unemployment is confused, but it is clear that the last three years 
have seen a sharp rise in under-employment. However, the re-framing of the financial crisis 
as a fiscal crisis, the result of a bloated state, has legitimated the targeting of austerity 
measures on ‘benefit dependency’: both the June 2010 Budget and October 2010 Spending 
Review initiated steep cuts in benefits and tax credits which will be progressively 
implemented, while the Universal Credit combines current means-tested support for adults 
and children into one benefit for those who are out of work or low waged.  There has 
therefore been a significant drop in the real income levels of both employed and unemployed 
(Bawden, 2011; Smith, 2012), and the Institute for Fiscal Studies has predicted that the rate of 
poverty will increase dramatically in the coming years (Brewer et al 2011).  The 
conditionality of benefits has also been intensified, making accessing them more complex and 
burdensome.3  Evidently, this complexity, together with the severity of the cuts and resulting 
                                                 
2 In fact the NFP sector began engaging in legal advice work in the early 1970s.  In addition to the long established CABx and emerging Law Centre 
movement,  new agencies began to spring up.  This development was part of a more general burgeoning of the advice sector, and was largely funded by grants 
from local authorities, whose role had similarly expanded at this time. CABx led  the move to employ a small  number of lawyers to support its lay workforce, 
and in the mid 1980s, following a proposal to a government Efficiency Scrutiny that significant savings would be made by transferring legal advice to the NFP 
advice sector, contemplated bidding for this work.  The idea was dropped in part because of opposition to the idea from within theCAB (Smith 2011 p 12) 
3 Since conditional entitlement is fundamental to the neo-liberal project, the move to these changes in benefits was initiated by the Thatcher government, and 
since then has been progressively extended and intensified.   The manner in which all claimants of Incapacity Benefit have been re-tested – described by 
Levitas (2012: 323) as both incompetent and brutal - exemplifies the increasingly punitive and complex administration of benefits 
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rise in debt and homelessness, family breakdowns and mental health problems, has increased 
the need for specialist legally aided advice and assistance (LCF 2011; Morris 2012).  
Furthermore, as the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has acknowledged ‘legal aid recipients are 
amongst the most disadvantaged in society, reflecting both the nature of the problems they 
face as well as their eligibility for legal aid’ (MOJ 2011: 13).  However, the transformation of 
welfare rights into contingent benefits is fundamental to the displacement of what in the US 
was termed a ‘war on poverty’ by a ‘war on the poor’ (Katz 1990), entailing parallel 
restrictions on the capacity to make legal claims to those benefits.  Thus despite the NFP 
sector’s ostensibly key role in the Big Society, its funding has been cut and its clientele 
stigmatised.   
 
The paper has two objectives. The first is to draw on the findings of qualitative 
research conducted over a period of 3 years with front line workers and managers in the NfP 
legal advice and assistance sector to discuss their experience of the changing relationship with 
government and the LSC, and the impact of the funding cuts generally, and in particular of 
LASPO.  Our second objective is to place these experiences in a theoretical frame which, 
firstly, uses the concepts, now widespread in social policy analysis, of the capture or 
colonisation of the NFP sector (Hogg and Baines, 2011, p. 345), and, secondly, highlights the 
significance of discourses of  autonomisation, responsibilization  (Mead 1986; Murray 1986; 
and see Garland 1991; Clarke 2005) and entrepreneurialism (see DTI/DfEE 2001; European 
Commission 2004; BERR 2008) in locating the causes of poverty in the individual rather than 
macro structural factors; transferring responsibility for welfare provision from the state to 
welfare recipients and the community generally, and marketising all service provision.4   
These discourses and the policies they spawn, summarised as moral regulation of the poor 
(Chunn and Gavigan 2004) and popular with governments on both sides of the Atlantic,5 
represent key components of the neo-liberal privatisation of the state and its underpinning 
free-market individualistic mythologies. This theoretical framing allows us to locate our 
discussion of the impact of LASPO, and the ways in which it is compounding the 
transformations in the culture, mission and practices of NFP agencies which contracting 
initiated, in a wider context of socio-political change.  Accounts of the development of the 
neo-liberal challenge to the post-war welfare settlement usually begin with the election of the 
Thatcher government in 1979.  However, following an outline of our methods, our discussion 
                                                 
4 Giddens (1990) and Beck (1992) see the increasing individualisation of responsibility for success and/or failure is inherent in late modernity.  This focus 
constructs success as the result of an individual  rather than in any way the result of structural positioning. Eekelar (1991)  points out how the principles of 
‘responsibalisation  noted by Garland (2001) in relation to responses to the ‘crime control complex’ of late modernity are equally evident in moves to promote 
parental responsibility as being pre-eminently an individual responsibility thus absolving the state from a wider duty of care’ 
5 See for instance Ilcan and Basok, 2004.  Collins and Mayer describe how, during the 1980s and 1990s, neo-liberal philosophies and practices peaked  with 
the introduction of the Family Support Act in 1988 (Reagan Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) (Clinton) in 1996. 
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of respondents’ accounts and the policies and discourses leading up to the Big Society idea 
and LASPO will trace policy trajectories from the establishment of the legal aid scheme. 
 
Methods and sample 
The study was conducted from 2009-12. The precarious and complex nature of the 
NFP sector’s funding (Bull and Sergeant 1996), requiring it to maintain multiple income 
streams, has long been a defining characteristic, constraining what could be achieved (and see 
Davies, 2011, p. 644 on the issue of funding for the sector generally).  Consequently, one of 
the attractions of LSC contracts was that they would provide a more secure financial basis for 
welfare advice.  Nevertheless, concerns were expressed even in the early days of the 
relationship about the changes it would generate, both to practitioners’ ways of working and 
their values. These values emphasised client empowerment and entailed the creative use of 
expertise in welfare law to challenge discretionary decisions and thereby hold both local and 
national government to account.  Evidently, in order to fulfil this function agencies need to be 
independent, but close to, and credible in the eyes of, client communities. 
 
Our previous research (Sommerlad and Sanderson 2009) indicated that for many 
agencies the growing significance of the LSC contract as opposed to recurrent grants income, 
and the increasingly interventionist nature of the contract, did have the effect of progressively 
undermining the sector’s independence and changing its culture.  By 2009 this process had 
been accentuated by ongoing downward pressure on the unit cost of contracted services, 
intensified by the introduction of fixed fees, and the shift by the LSC to what the sector 
perceived as a punitive form of auditing (ibid). A primary research aim was therefore to 
explore how these developments were impacting on the sector’ practices, culture and morale. 
Conducted over a three year period, this was an iterative process; however, from 2010 
onwards, the research aims widened to explore the impact of the Coalition austerity 
programme and in particular LASPO. 
 
Using snowball sampling techniques, we recruited representatives from sixteen 
organizations, primarily based in London.  These organizations included some of the biggest, 
national agencies, umbrella advice organizations, specialist agencies which only took test 
cases and offered expert support to the rest of the sector, individual law centres, and small, 
specialist advice centres.  The sample therefore encompassed agencies that were solely 
dependent on legal aid funding, and ones for whom legal aid represented one element in a 
basket of income streams which varied in both their source and their character. 
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Our research methods included: participant observation at two conferences (2011 and 
2012) focused on the impact of LASPO and the austerity programme in general, which were 
attended by representatives of a comprehensive range of advice agencies; a focus group (held 
in 2009) with members of the policy team of a national umbrella advice organization, and a 
total of 21 in-depth interviews with agency managers and also with individuals working in 
front line advice delivery.  The questions for the policy group mainly focused on the adaptive 
strategies that its membership agencies were developing in order to deal with the new 
landscape of legal aid, which included the implementation of fixed fees, whilst the individual 
interviews also explored the impact of the reforms on the values, internal structure and 
practices of agencies and individual workers, and on clients. 
 
The analysis of interview data was supported by documentary material to which 
agencies were kind enough to give us access, and also organizations’ websites (such as 
Annual Reports and surveys).  For reasons of confidentiality, we have not named the 
participating organizations, and as far as possible have avoided using any material that could 
identify groups or individuals involved (apart from a few agencies which specifically asked to 
be named).  In the following section we discuss respondents’ accounts of the impact of the 
progressive changes experienced by the sector, prior to LASPO, in the context of discourses 
and policies towards legal aid and welfare generally.  It begins with a brief outline of the 
establishment of legal aid. 
 
Legal Aid: from inception to 2010 
By the mid 1980s the UK could credibly claim to provide access to justice as a result 
of its  extensive network of NFP agencies which, primarily funded by local authority grants, 
offered welfare advice, and a generous legal aid scheme.  However, this generosity masked 
fundamental weaknesses which were largely attributable to the compromises made with the 
legal profession prior to the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949.  Thus the difficulties in 
controlling the budget stemmed in part from the fact that until 1989 legal aid was delivered 
and administered by the profession (Goriely 1994) and, even after the transfer of 
responsibility for its administration to the Legal Aid Board, private practitioners remained its 
primary providers. The decision to adopt this ‘judicare’ 6 system precluded the fulfilment of 
Marshall’s aim to address the ‘law’s democratic deficit’ (Smith 1997: 1) by increasing the use 
of mediation, simplifying the law, and deploying salaried or volunteer advisors (on the model 
                                                 
6 The term judicare is a North American one, and is based on the idea that access to justice meant that lawyers’ services should be available to everyone so that 
‘no one will be financially unable to prosecute a just and reasonable claim or defend a legal right and counsel and solicitors (would be) remunerated for their 
services’ (Lord Chancellor 1948, cited in Smith 1997: 13) 
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established by CABx during World War II).7   Instead, legal aid was targeted on traditional 
private practice specialisms (such as family law), and came to represent a significant part of 
many high street law firms’ incomes, leading to the criticism that it had become ‘a hostage to 
law firms’ overheads, hourly rates and inefficiencies’ (Dyer 1995).  At the same time, as other 
critics pointed out, areas of need, such as advice on social welfare law and tribunal 
representation, were either neglected by private practitioners or not served at all (Smith 1997). 
 
The Conservative Government’s proposal to reform legal aid provision through a 
system of block contracts (franchising) (LCD 1995) could be seen to some extent as a 
response to this criticism, and consequently generated cautious support from some, especially 
in the NFP sector. The Legal Aid Group (LAG) applauded the focus on ‘social welfare’ law 
(Chapman 1996), and the parallels between the franchising scheme and elements of its own 
civil justice proposals (LAG 1992).8 Particularly welcome were the plans to include in the 
contracts quality assurance measures and the requirement that providers possessed a degree of 
specialisation. The centring of the client (and deployment of the language of individual 
empowerment) represented another point of apparent agreement. 
 
However, whereas for radical practitioners client empowerment signified a 
fundamental re-negotiation of the traditional professional-client relationship, for the 
Conservative administration consumer sovereignty was a key strand of the neo-liberal critique 
of ‘producer power’ in public sector professionalism (Perkin 1990) which it aimed to 
constrain and re-shape through the infusion of an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ (Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992).  The arguments of these ideologues of the New Right legitimated a policy 
designed to ‘reinvent government’ (ibid; and see Haque 1994) through a combination of 
measures including outsourcing, tight managerial control grounded in the introduction of 
internal markets, the concomitant monetisation and corporatisation of services, and financial 
retrenchment (summed up in the term New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991)).  The 
conceptualisation of quality was therefore, like that of the client, ambivalent: applied to the 
legal aid sector, one dimension of it supported the narrative of the rentier public sector 
professional in which legal professionals exploited their monopoly status and specialist 
knowledge (‘information asymmetry’) to increase both the volume and price of their work 
                                                 
7 Marshall (1950), one of the visionaries of the welfare state, argued that post war socialized citizenship had initiated a transformation of the formulaic equality 
of liberal legalism into a more responsive and policy oriented forms of law and lawyering (Sommerlad, 2004) which he hoped would be fully realised in the 
tribunal system.  It has been argued that even had this vision been fully realised, the problems inherent in a capitalist legal system – such as the dichotomy 
between legal and social justice and the resulting  individualisation and de-politicisation of systemic problems  -  would have remained (see e.g. Abel 1985).   
8 LAG had long been critical of the fact that any High Street General Practitioner was allowed to deliver legally aided services whether or not they had 
specialist expertise in the client’s legal need and without any effective external scrutiny; they therefore advocated greater control over legally aided services 
through a scheme which resembled franchising (LAG 1992; and see Hansen 1992) 
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(‘supplier induced inflation’) (Bevan 1996).   Another dimension propagated an image of the 
vexatious (litigious) client who pursued unmeritorious claims (at taxpayers’ expense) 9  and 
whose interests therefore had to be subordinated to achieving value for money for the 
taxpayer (the true client) (Sommerlad 1995). The proposed remedies for these, intertwined, 
moral hazards were to cap the civil legal aid budget (LCD 1995) and model the quality 
assurance measures on a manufacturing conception of quality as ‘fitness for purpose’, thereby 
constraining professional discretion. 
 
Although critical of Conservative policies towards the welfare state and legal aid 
while in opposition, once in government (1997-2010) New Labour first maintained and then 
increasingly developed many key elements. On the one hand, it persisted with the plan to 
focus on welfare law and erode private practitioners’ monopoly by shifting significant parts of 
social provision onto the NFP sector, a development which was enacted in the AJA 1999. The 
‘Third Way’ for legal aid also involved the precise articulation of the concept of ‘unmet legal 
need’ based on innovative metrics which allowed the embryonic Community Legal Service to 
identify exactly how many matter starts in specific areas such as debt, housing and welfare 
advice, might be required in a given geographical area (Pleasence et al. 2004; 2006). Further, 
respondents generally agreed that in the early days of the LSC there was real concern to raise 
the quality of the service, leading to peer review and the preferred supplier system; several 
attributed this in large part to the first LSC Chief Executive who was described as ‘open about 
protecting legal aid and protecting the sector’ independence’. (manager advice agency 2009) 
 
On the other hand, despite official enthusiasm for the sector’s social capital, expertise 
and innovative ways of working, the Third Way approach entailed the application of 
competitive discipline to the tendering for contracts for the provision of legal advice.  Many 
practitioners were uncomfortable about the market principles, and the primacy of efficiency 
and ‘best value’ which the contract culture introduced (Deakin 1996).  Its  inexorable and 
corrosive impact on a poorly resourced sector is captured in Benson and Waterhouse’s 
description  of  contracting  as ‘a beast which needs feeding’ which therefore does not ‘leave 
much room for advice work’ (2001, 7).  Stein, echoing Power’s discussion of the implications 
of the accounting logic, stressed the cultural shift that it was producing:  ‘with a focus on high 
                                                 
9 Exemplified by  the description  of legal aid clients as ‘state funded rottweillers’ by Gary Streeter, Conservative Under Secretary of State at the Lord 
Chancellors Department , quoted in:  ‘Streeter confirms legally aided litigants are rottweillers’ (1996) New Law Journal, 1378  
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output cases, franchising has denigrated thorough diagnostic work, preventive advice, 
community education and policy advocacy’ (2001, 30).10 
 
These concerns were seen as even more pressing by 2009: ‘the whole notion of 
contracting is that there is no distinction between the voluntary sector and a private practice 
firm - you bid for a specification and you do it.  You don’t argue with them about what’s 
necessary.’ (Law Centre lawyer, 2009)  And another Law Centre practitioner argued that: 
‘although New Labour use the language of increasing access to justice, the contracts are 
structured in such a way that they require a lot of robust financial discipline, which a lot of the 
sector didn’t have at the time and are still struggling to get in place - partly because of lack of 
infrastructure – this is key to difficulties NFP sector faces because of inadequate investment ’ 
 
Another respondent cited the extension to NFP practitioners of the distrust of the 
public sector professional, fundamental to the neo-liberal policy agenda, as a further 
important factor which progressively undermined the sector’s capacity to maintain its 
traditional mission: ‘there’s been this big shift to “there’s none of these people we can trust”.   
They distrust the profession.  They don’t want to allow for professional judgements…this 
feeling has grown since * (name of first Chief Executive) has gone’ (member umbrella group 
2009), and the reflections of a manager point up how this progressive devaluation of 
practitioners justified a hardening of LSC controls: ‘at the beginning they were very in favour 
of the sector, it was wonderful, and then because, in their view, the work took so long, they 
started talking about how NFP people were all suffering from a Mother Theresa complex, 
there were these real cultural problems, etc.  And one comment was,’ look, at the end of the 
day, we are not going to pay for somebody to hold people’s hands and fill in forms’’ 
 
This implicit portrayal of the client and advisor relationship as one of unnecessary 
(and unhealthy) dependency is linked to the neo-liberal discourse of parasitic and hence 
immoral benefit dependency.  As state-Keynesian social democracy appeared decreasingly 
viable in the face of globalization New Labour’s endorsement of  this discourse, in which the 
welfare state figured  as ‘the arch enemy of freedom’ (Hall 2011), became progressively 
dominant. The dual antinomies which characterise this discourse, and which we identified 
above, counterpose firstly the deserving and un-deserving, hardworking families and welfare 
recipients, reflecting the growing strength of ‘cultural deficit’ theory in New Labour thinking, 
                                                 
10 Over the course of New Labour's time in office more and more public services were contracted out to the NFP sector, doubling government spending on it 
to £11 billion a year (HM Government, 2009, p. 6).  The policy reflected the enthusiasm for communitarianism and hence for the sector’s contribution to civic 
cohesion, yet at the same time stigmatisation of the sector’s clients and increasingly interventionist regulation combined to undermine its original values and 
morale (see, e.g. Morris and Atkinson 2003 for discussion of the loss of the negative impact on the independence and governance of the sector as a whole) 
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and laying the foundation for an argument for the absolute lack of entitlement for one sector 
of welfare recipients.11  The second opposition between taxpayers and all welfare recipients, 
imposes a calculus on consideration of those benefits received even by the ‘deserving’. 
 
This calculus was expressed in multiple ways including an increase in the conditionality 
of welfare generally12  and specifically in the legal aid field through the imposition (2007) of 
fixed fees, more stringent auditing and the abandonment of quality measures such as the 
preferred supplier system.  Together these measures sought to ensure that practitioners did no 
more for clients than was absolutely necessary, thereby obliging them to ‘make a business as 
well as a professional judgement when deciding whether to take a client’s case on, and when 
considering how to progress it -  ultimately, the business judgement must trump your 
professional judgement.’ (Law Centre solicitor 2010).13 In 2009 the policy group of one 
umbrella organization summarised these changes in the following way: 
‘they are essentially about marketising the Legal Aid sector; in order to do this they are 
having to go through a process of commodification so that they can price the product, 
introducing standard fees. For our sector, the impact and the timescale have been very 
significant, because until last October (2007) Not for Profit agencies were paid – or 
most were paid – on an hourly basis, that is for the work that they did.  This has now 
changed to a standard fee, different fees for different areas of law, with some get out 
clauses for (exceptional) cases that take three times the standard fee ‘. 
 
The impact of fixed fees on the finances of agencies which relied on contracts was 
‘catastrophic’ (London Law Centre lawyer; and see NEF Report 2010; LCF 2011):  
‘We’re dependent on the LSC for 75% of our income. Fixed fees were announced 
October 2007; there was this transitional phase for the first six months but after that if 
you didn’t meet your targets they started chipping away at funding. That’s when 
everyone started hitting cash flow difficulties - because instead of getting paid in 
advance, by the hour, we get paid a (low) fixed fee when billed.  We used to be 
guaranteed £90,000 a month from the LSC under the old system.  This went down to 
                                                 
11 Thus Labour MP Frank Field has argued that ‘even if the money were available to lift all children out of income poverty in the short term, it is far from 
clear that this move would in itself close the achievement gap’ 2010  
12 This intensification of conditionality was supported by  the increasingly authoritarian aspect of  New Labour’s communitarian thinking, for instance the 
emphasis in policy debates on the need for claimant responsibility (White 2000) and  endorsement of the neo-liberal refrain that ‘benefits trap people into a 
lifetime of dependency’ (DWP 2006). The clear objective was a system where virtually everyone claiming benefit and not in work should have personalised 
support for a return to work, backed by compulsory work-related activity and sanctions.  Hence the Welfare Reform Act 2007 which introduced employment 
and support allowance (ESA), a tougher medical test and increased engagement with personal advisers and work-related activity. The Welfare Reform Act 
2009 aimed further to increase conditionality by enacting the 2008 review of conditionality (Gregg, 2008)  which separated claimants into a work-ready group; 
a progression to work group; and a  no-conditionality group.  
13 There is an extensive literature on how  neo-liberalism commodifies social welfare and social justice and  generally, approaching the human relationships 
involved in terms of supply and demand (see, for example,  Dominelli 1999 and Raewyn et al 2009) 
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half that, and we just couldn’t bill in the same volume, moreover we’d only get it when 
we billed. In the early stages of this contract, Law Centre reserves were depleted by 
over 70%; a few places ended up ‘in casualty’ and had to be bailed out.’   
 
These financial problems were compounded for agencies which tended to have complex 
cases and which remained committed to high quality (that is time consuming) work, as 
another Law Centre lawyer describes:  ‘fixed fees were so low – for example, £171 for a 
housing case, to cover about 3 hours advice. This is very little time to get instructions and act 
on them.’ However the responsibilization discourse and its narrative of the symbiotic 
relationship between a disempowering advisor and (unnecessarily) dependent claimant 
entailed the construction of the typical client as someone who only needed minimal support 
and guidance, thereby legitimising both the new fee system and also the LSC’s increasing 
emphasis on telephone and web-based advice (Sanderson and Sommerlad, 2011). But few of 
the sector’s clients resembled this ‘model’ consumer of legal services, and therefore, as this 
Law Centre lawyer continued, the ease or difficulty with which a matter could be handled in 
the limited time granted by fixed fees depended ‘on the complexity of case, language of 
client, their mental state etc.’  And he explained that while in theory the system catered for 
this situation: ‘if it qualifies as an ‘exceptional’ case - which means you do 3 times as much 
work – 12 hours – then you can stretch your profit costs up to three times the fixed fee’, in 
practice, giving a case more attention was  ‘a gamble because a lot of cases fall in between – 
they take much longer than the basic fixed fee but not long enough to qualify as exceptional.’ 
 
The incentive initiated by the contracting process to focus on high output cases, 
identified by Stein (2001), cited above, was therefore increased by these later reforms.  A 
further effect was to accentuate the sidelining of social policy, campaigning work because, in 
the words of a manager of an out of London agency, ‘they imposed, which was one of the 
aims, business discipline on case workers and organisations where that didn’t exist before’. 
One solution was to cherry pick cases: ‘fixed fees have meant that the incentive is just not to 
do certain work on cases’, and also to withdraw from whole areas of law, as this manager of a 
small London agency went on to explain: ‘we’ve stopped doing some work in certain subjects 
because we couldn’t make it pay – employment, immigration; as time’s gone on, over the last 
10 years private law firms, especially small ones, have also dropped out and that process is 
continuing’ 
 
Another solution was to deliver a lower quality service:  ‘the temptation is to strip it 
down to doing the minimum because if you take longer over a case that’s your loss, your 
problem, it’s not the LSC’s.’ (member of umbrella organization). The account of a small 
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London agency of dropping some work and increasing the volume of cases in other areas is 
illustrative of these various strategies: ‘We’ve faced a squeeze over the last few years with 
fixed fees, so we’ve had to pump up the volume as far as the number of cases that each case 
worker needs to see, so they can’t spend as long on a case.  But even if we do that, you just 
can’t make some work pay - that’s one of the reasons we stopped doing asylum work because 
fixed fees make this sort of work uneconomic because you get paid the same whether you’re 
doing a very long complicated case or a short one’.  Like other respondents, for this lawyer 
the model client who can take responsibility for their own case was a mythical beast:  his 
agency’s clients, like those described by the Law Centre lawyer quoted above, ‘tended to 
have complications, quite a few of them have English as a second language or there were 
disability issues, so they needed incapacity benefit, so there were issues around providing 
social care and/ or explaining what was happening rather than just writing off the letters and 
that’s all you do.’  
 
The reflections of one respondent on  the shift in New Labour’s discourse and policy 
away from valuing the sector’s ‘social capital and envisaging it as having a real social policy 
role .. com(ing) up with strategies including test case, litigation strategies’, led her to argue 
that a process of incorporation had taken place: ‘Not for Profit agencies or political agencies 
have always claimed to have this mission.  You can doubt it, but nevertheless it had some 
truth and it gave you a position from which you can say: “We know about this.  This is what 
we’re about.  We have a voice, and we’re going to say this” The state is now incorporating all 
that energy and ideology and is going to control it and more or less kill it.’ 
 
Her conclusion was that ‘it’s only  going to be very brave, very strong organisations 
that are going to say, “we’ve got the contract but we’re still going to do what we’ve always 
done.”  You are going to have a very robust governance and very robust ideology to be able to 
do that.  I don’t think a lot of organisations are going to be able to do it.’  The evidence of 
individual practitioners, especially those based in larger, and/ or national organizations, of the 
changes generated by contracting and then fixed fees in governance, management and key 
personnel14 suggested her pessimism was well founded.  The description of one adviser of her 
large, national)organization were typical: ‘it has become a very managerial organisation – 
we’re now run by highly paid managers who know nothing about advising, with a completely 
different ethos who have instituted all these systems – targets and so on. There’s bullying and 
a lot of people have been ‘weeded out’.’ 
 
                                                 
14 See Defourny and Nyssens, 2010; Hemmings, 2011; Emejulu and Bassel, 2012 for evidence of the same development in the NFP sector generally, both in 
the UK and internationally 
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Thus by the time of the 2010 election, the foundations for Coalition policy towards 
welfare and legal aid had been firmly laid.  Further, the change in the relationship between 
government and the sector formed part of a wider re-shaping of the ideological and socio-
economic terrain through a campaign, framed in a populist moral discourse, against 
redistributive taxation and welfare provision, described by one respondent as aimed at 
‘reassuring Daily Mail readers - civil law is not popular.  Money being funnelled into helping 
hapless people who won’t help themselves… asylum seekers, people who can’t even keep a 
roof over their heads.  So there’s a kind of appeasement going on of middle England’  As a 
result, the sector was, in the words of a solicitor, ‘very demoralised -  it used to be distinctive, 
ie Not for Profit, but then it got into bed with the  LSC who began to require  the standards of 
profit making organizations - I’m not talking about disorganised people, but about different 
cultures and also resources – I’m on the Committee of *  Advice Centre and it just didn’t have 
the resources for all the bureaucracy so they had four very fraught years  and then handed the 
contract back.  Then there’s the local Law Centre which is a very large player for the LSC but 
the staff don’t like the business focus - incredibly good at what they do but very low morale’ 
 
Morale in the sector was clearly also affected by what one respondent described as 
New Labour’s aim to cut legal aid ‘down to a residual service’;  Colin Crouch made the same 
claim about New Labour policy towards the public sector and welfare services generally 
(Crouch 2001; and see Bochel 2011:21). Such a policy precludes an adequate publicly funded 
right to access to justice to secure these services.  Nevertheless, despite the continuities 
between New Labour and the Coalition (see, e.g. Davies 2011; Hogg and Baines, 2012) the 
current programme of ‘rolling back the state to a level of intervention below that in the United 
States’ has been described as ‘unprecedented’ (Taylor-Goodby and  Stoker 2011:14) and ‘the 
most radical, far-reaching and irreversible social revolution since the war’ (Hall 2011: 23). 
 
LASPO and the Big Society 
Clarke and Newman highlight the ideological work which has gone into 
reconfiguring the financial crisis as fiscal and political, and how this work has, in an echo of 
New Labour’s authoritarian communitarianism, turned on a ‘moral and social vocabulary of 
responsibility and interdependence’ (Clarke and Newman 2012: 303).  However the 
counterpart to the Coalition’s refrain that the cure for Britain’s ‘atomised’ and ‘broken 
society’ rests with the individual citizen and the community, is the allegation that the  (New 
Labour) ‘big state’ has caused both the fiscal crisis and the erosion of the moral economy.15  
Clearly those whose welfare dependence has eviscerated their ‘personal and social 
                                                 
15 Blond summarised the ‘project of radical transformative conservatism’ as ‘nothing less than the restoration and creation of human association’ 2010 
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responsibility’ exemplify the ‘selfishness and individualism’ created by the big state 
(Cameron 2009: 1).  Thus, while in the Marshallian form of social citizenship, the law, and 
access to it, was inextricably linked for both practical and ideological reasons to the 
establishment of welfare rights and responsive, accountable government,  for Big Society 
citizenship, it is not only financially untenable but also positively immoral to make state 
welfare provision (especially of an unconditional kind).16  It is therefore unsurprising that 
neither the overwhelming opposition to LASPO from a range of stakeholders in the justice 
system including the judiciary (Judges Council of England and Wales, 2011)  and the Justice 
Select Committee (2011) nor evidence that the cuts are unlikely bring savings (Cookson 
2011) could dissuade the government from its course.   
 
So while it is possible to argue that in terms of the discursive framing of legal aid 
reform, there is continuity between New Labour and the Coalition, the evidence of a rupture 
lies in the both the extent and ideological thrust of the cuts. The areas from which LASPO has 
removed civil legal aid provision include decisions about Disability Living or Attendance 
Allowance; Incapacity Benefit; Income Support and other benefits; housing matters other than 
those concerning homelessness or serious disrepairs which threaten health and debt matters 
where the client’s home is not at immediate risk.  The MOJ has calculated that between 
460,000 and 512,000 potential claimants will be affected, and LAG estimates that an 
additional 150,000 will lose entitlement.  Further, despite denials that the legislation is 
discriminatory, the MOJ’s own Equality Impact Assessment demonstrates that women and 
ethnic minorities will be disproportionately affected by many of the scope changes (MOJ, 
2011). LASPO also imposes mandatory efficiency savings on the remaining civil provision: 
by 2016 another £70m will be removed from the budget (currently legal aid expenditure is 
just over £2bn a year).  One respondent commented: ‘the drive behind the AJA to bring the 
NFP agencies in to give advice under legal aid to the most vulnerable is being reversed, and 
this is having a hugely de-stabilising effect on the NFP sector just when its services will be 
most needed’ (2010).  
 
Respondents’ accounts of the impact of the financial crisis and LASPO 
The MOJ estimates that its legal aid reforms will cut the income of the NFP sector by 
92% (MOJ, 2011) and from the publication of the LASPO Green Paper 2010 onwards, the 
majority of respondents were primarily preoccupied with the impact that this and the austerity 
programme in general would have on their financial viability. The view that the sector would 
be ‘virtually wiped out’ was widely shared.  Others focused on the increase in demand (which 
                                                 
16 This position forms part of a wider re-conceptualisation of the ideological basis for the state’s engagement in other private civil law matters (Vogel 2005). 
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was already manifesting itself) and decline in capacity to meet it. The strategies discussed by 
agency managers and many NFP publications (see for instance Ellison and Flint n.d.) tended 
to revolve around the need to make a business case to potential funders, which then generated 
other strategies such as charging clients, increasing demands on the workforce, making 
redundancies, increasing use of volunteers, mergers and closure.  The main concerns 
disclosed by practitioners ranged from intensification of managerial pressure of the kind 
identified by Hemmings (2011), job security, and the impact on clients.  A common theme for 
all was the loss of the last vestiges of the sector’s independence and mission. 
 
Funding and the Business Case: towards social enterprise 
As we concluded in our previous discussion of legal aid and the sector, Coalition policy 
may be seen as the culmination of thirty years of neo-liberal discourses and tight budgetary 
policies designed to shift public institutions and NFP agencies from a “spending model” to a 
business model. The austerity programme is therefore being implemented in  a sector whose 
longstanding financial fragility has already been significantly accentuated.  Reflecting on the 
likely effect of further cuts, respondents referred to this fragility, emphasising the precarious, 
complex, and often short term nature of existing funding arrangements. Moreover, as one 
manager explained, ‘most NFP organisations don’t actually make a surplus, it’s very hard to 
make the contracts work on the volumes we do’.  By 2011 all agencies said they were either 
already experiencing, or anticipating experiencing, a financial crisis as all sources of income 
including funding from local authorities and other organizations such as the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission either declined or ceased. The following account by a London 
based Afro-Asian Advisory Service at the end of 2012 is exemplary: 
We had an LSC contract for immigration and asylum which provided a third of our 
funding (£62000); this ends March 2013 as LASPO has taken all immigration out of 
scope.  We’ve been granted another LSC contract for asylum and human rights,  
however it’s for only £45000; for that we have to do 103 cases/ matter starts – so we 
will have to work very hard for that money.  Our other funding source is the local 
authority which traditionally provided us with around a quarter of our income - £53000.  
This was due to end January 2013, but they’ve extended it for 3 months during which 
time they will decide what to do in the future.’ 
 
This situation was exacerbated by the fact that specific lines of work were often subject 
to mixed or matched funding: ‘we’ve always got pots of funds from many different sources 
and then stitched them up into a package. Each strand relates to another. The problem is all 
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the funding sources are under attack now’. 17   The Under-Secretary of State for Justice, 
Jonathan Djanogly, recognised this state of affairs: ‘the problem for those that give legal 
advice is that legal aid funding often merges with other funding schemes. CABx are funded 
mainly by local councils and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills . removing 
one stream could have a knock on effect ..’ (Legal Aid Reform Debate, 3 February 2011 
http://www.jonathandjanogly.com/content/legal-aid-reform-debate). 
 
The account by a manager in an umbrella organization confirms his judgement:  
For some agencies, especially the Law Centres – for instance the Mary Ward Law 
Centre - legal aid is very significant proportion of their income and there are therefore 
fears about their sustainability.  Even for other agencies less reliant on legal aid 
funding, it can / does pull in other funding, so if it goes, then it has a wider impact. But 
in fact virtually all other funding pots are under strain too.  For instance the London 
Councils Grant, which is a collective grant of £27million to the sector, is being reduced 
to £5m a year.  On top of that you have local authorities making cuts - greater in many 
cases (from between 20-40%) than the cuts imposed on them by central government.’   
As a result, having become reliant on the contracts, ‘the fact that they’re stopping for 
everyone at the same time means that trying to find alternative funding, alternative work is 
going to be nigh on impossible because there will be a rush.’  Another said: ‘we’re all 
scrabbling around for the same pots of money’.18   
 
Consequently, as a member of an umbrella group said: ‘you increasingly hear the 
terminology ‘Business Model’ – The Development Officer for  * (name of another umbrella 
organization) is pushing this really hard.’  This was confirmed in an interview with this 
officer who began with the following comments: ‘we must make the business case for 
funding welfare advice and legal aid’ and continued by articulating the responsibilization 
discourse,   ‘we must show that the legal aid system is about getting out of the trench and 
trying to help people help themselves – in a way we’re tired of helping people so want to help 
people help themselves – for instance 66% of CABx now do financial education’, and another 
manager said ‘the way forward is to promote capability and resilience – self help’.  
 
The continuities with New Labour were pointed up by one manager who stated that 
‘commissioning had already begun to make us much more business minded and 
entrepreneurial’, but whose subsequent comments indicated that the desperate financial 
                                                 
17 Examples agencies gave of these different ‘pots’ included  the Financial Inclusion Fund; Big Lottery; EHRC; Lord Chancellor’s grant; Local Authority 
grants. The Advice UK survey (December 2010) http://www.adviceuk.org.uk/projects-and-resources  found that 89.5% of its members experiencing major cuts 
18 For the sector as a whole (inot just engaged in legal advice), it is estimated that the austerity programme entails £4.5 billion spending cuts (Ellison 2011).  
 16 
situation meant  that the business model had become absolutely hegemonic: ‘now we must 
demonstrate the financial case for everything – everything is about the cost benefits.’  The 
resulting pressure for more restructuring, adoption of commercial practices and shedding 
whatever remains of its traditional roles (such as campaigning) (Davies 2011:645) has been 
further intensified by the decision, emanating from the Conservatives’ market liberal wing, to 
open up many services to outsourcing (Wiggan 2011).19   
 
Yet at the same time the Big Society agenda has emphasised not only shifting power 
from the state to local communities but also increasing social justice and reducing poverty 
(Ellison 2011: 45-6). The evident tension between these aims and the austerity programme 
and the primacy given to business is supposedly resolved in the concept of social enterprise.20 
One leader in the sector reflected on the success of this approach: ‘here we all are, talking 
about how we can become social enterprises, how we can find private partners’, and 
her point was demonstrated at an Advice Now conference (2011) where  enterprise and the 
need to make a business case was raised by successive speakers and pervaded the literature 
distributed. Pamphlets with titles like ‘Social Enterprise Works’ and ‘Advice UK Pamphlet of 
Social Enterprise’ advised on how to transform an agency into an enterprise and develop a 
business plan in order to be able to ‘demonstrate .. there is a good market for your product ..‘ 
and establish a brand image for key funders’, while ‘Managing in Tough Times’ offers ‘a 
model from the commercial world ..that can be easily used by Third Sector organizations’ 
(Ellison and Flint n.d.: 4). The presentation by one of the funders attending the conference 
reinforced this message: ‘we expect the sector will get its own act together and locally do 
what it can to reduce duplication, improve efficiency, make even better use of volunteers’ 
(Director Strategy & Improvement Kensington & Chelsea, 2010).21   This pressure on the 
bottom line implied reducing specialist full-time staffing, and all agencies reported that either 
this or short term working was being implemented.  
 
However, managers and advisors from a range of agencies also stressed the 
difficulties of competing in markets, especially with private business. These ranged from the 
expense and limitations of volunteers to the ‘general lack of infrastructure’ including the 
                                                 
19 For this strand of the Conservative party  it is not just the NFP sector which brings value but also the For Profit sector In the House of Commons debates 
over the Big Society, Tesco was cited by MP Christopher Chope as an example of the For Profit sector creating social capital. 
20 The concept of Social Enterprise has been articulated by Hurd and Maude as follows:  ‘a strategy to grow the social investment market giving charities and 
social enterprises access to new potentially multi billion pound capital..  cornerstone of the social investment market attracting more investment from wealthy 
individuals, charitable foundations and ultimately socially responsible everyday savers in social ISAs and pension funds’ (14/2/11 cited  in House of Commons 
Justice Committee p 50). In practice, as Dufourny and Nyssens note, in the UK this formulation tends to place an emphasis on a business model (rather than 
the cooperative model embraced more commonly in continental Europe (2010)).     
21These demands chime with the vision for improving access to justice offered by Susskind who recommends that legal service providers embrace technology, 
commoditise services, become entrepreneurial, and market driven ’  Susskind: 2011: 11; see too Ellison, & Flint 2010  
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obsolete nature of IT systems and lack of back up staff.  One manager focused on how the 
collapse in funding had affected the capacity to plan ahead: ‘national, regional or local 
funding - it’s all over the place, and as a result, even though some cuts may not be coming in 
for 12-18 months, they are causing huge planning problems now.  The uncertainty makes it 
difficult to compete.’ 
 
One widely discussed business strategy, unthinkable to many respondents until 
recently, was the introduction of charges (see for instance Advice UK survey on 
charging: http://www.adviceuk.org.uk/projects-and-resources/Charging). Some managers 
identified areas like employment where this might be a possibility because of the prospect of 
compensation for the client, but noted the fact that it would introduce a two-tier service. 
Further, the extreme vulnerability and poverty of most of the sample’s clientele limits the 
scope to raise money through direct charges as well being seen as completely contrary to the 
sector’s mission: ‘we have had two meetings about whether we should charge people – I’m 
against this because I started this organization with a certain ethos - free advice to all who 
need it. But I can see that we’re being pushed towards these business practices as otherwise 
we’ll have to serve fewer and fewer clients, make people redundant and ultimately close – or 
drop our standards.’ (Founder, asylum and immigration advice centre).   
 
Mission Drift 
The pressure to introduce charging, the increase in funders’ already considerable 
influence over the internal policies and practices of NFP agencies,22  and the general drive 
towards enterprise were deep concerns for most respondents.  An agency manager said in 
2010: ‘people tend to do this work  because we’ve got a  charitable aim to provide these 
services and think we can provide a service even if we’re not making money from it – a better 
service than say a private firm because we’ve got certain values, an ethos which is user 
centred. In two years time when LASPO comes in,  the last bit of that ethos will vanish I 
think.’23 Others, echoing the concern expressed by a member of an umbrella organization in 
2009 that New Labour was incorporating the sector, saw the Big Society as transforming 
them into ‘an agent for the state.. it’s mission drift’.  Another said ‘our ability to influence is 
diminished – we are being dragged into government ambit’.  
 
These developments were also viewed as contributing to an erosion of the sector’s 
collaborative tradition, which had been predicated both on its independence from the state and 
its relative insulation from the market: ‘we are losing that sense of solidarity the sector had’; 
                                                 
22 LSC influence was enhanced through service level agreements as well as cost and compliance auditing (Sanderson and Sommerlad, 2009) 
23
 
The claim by the sector to deliver a better quality service than private practice is supported by the Moorhead et al (2001) study of quality
. 
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‘we are all now businesses  in competition for very limited pots of money.’  And the new 
climate was seen as bringing competitive advantage to some agencies because they had a 
history of being less combative or were more politically acceptable; thus a Law Centre 
worker stated that ‘the CAB is the Tories’ preferred brand – it fits with the Big Society 
rhetoric so they tend to get support from local authorities’.  Large national organizations like 
the CAB were also among the few agencies capable of competing with the For Profit sector.24  
 
However a policy officer argued that ‘the CAB will be toothless without specialists 
..they back up and give power to generalist advisors and set precedents’. A commonly 
articulated concern therefore was the loss of legal aid funding which had supported the 
development of a cadre of specialist advisors in many agencies:  ‘one of the impacts of the 
legal aid cuts will be to remove about 1000 specialist posts – they will no longer be funded’.  
The government’s justification that welfare benefits advice did not require specialist expertise 
was contested:   
‘it’s true that a lot of it is currently done by generalist and volunteers, but some of it 
does need to be done by specialists because benefit entitlements law is actually very 
complex and its interpretation is very tricky, and can involve other, complex areas of 
law; for instance, a housing case might turn on who owns the property – whether it’s 
held in trust by a member of the family – and you need to have some legal knowledge 
to spot that there is a complex legal issue involved –  if only in order to refer it.   
Nevertheless, it was predicted that agencies will ‘end up doing low level work, because we 
won’t be able to develop casework; that means the capacity to do case work will disappear as 
well’, and the loss of a collaborative tradition was returned to as this speaker went on to argue 
that this would destroy ‘the sector’s complex web of generalists and specialists’.  
 
All of the above developments – such as the pressure to make a business case, the 
increased influence of funders, erosion of the capacity to do casework – combined to intensify 
the mission drift identified above as already underway under New Labour. The following 
comments by a front line worker articulate the shift in the kind of moral calculus in which 
organizations once engaged, which has been termed an ‘economisation of the social’ (Shamir 
2008): ‘the danger is, if you monetise everything then it’s hard to make the case for other 
values such as the impact on mental health’.  She went on to argue that this also legitimised 
the exclusion of democratic values and rights since they have no place in the business case: 
‘how can you monetise what the government doesn’t want to hear - the value of holding it to 
account?’ 
                                                 
24 In other parts of the sector (unconnected with legal services) contracts have increasingly been given to the ‘big hitters’ (Davies, 2011: 643). 
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Other respondents gave concrete examples of the distortions which the business case 
generated:  ‘it’s difficult to balance the ethos of delivering a service with running a business.  
So for instance to evict people is to fail and once you’re out of social housing, that’s it, so we 
try to be flexible – but on the other hand now, since what we’re engaged in is effectively a 
business we can’t fail economically - so we must evict sooner than we would have before’ 
(social housing advice worker).  
 
Responsibilization and ‘clients’ as consumer 
Discussions of ways of responding to the crisis always moved at some point to 
different ways of dealing with clients, from introducing charging to embracing the 
government’s strategy of responsibilization.25  For some agencies this had resulted in a 
complete shift in focus, in which the client was now explicitly constructed as a consumer in 
the manner modelled by neo-liberal discourse (Baldock, 2003).  The strategy which flowed 
from this  paralleled the government’s devaluation of the welfare client: ‘within this team, 
already pretty thin on the ground after successive spending cuts,  the production of new and 
expanded consumer information on our website has inevitably resulted in a diversion of 
resources from welfare rights.’  Other government decisions rooted in the discourse of 
responsibilization, such as expanding telephone advice lines and establishing universal credit 
as an on line benefit, increased the pressure for agencies to develop similar practices.  Thus 
one agency manager said: ‘though we can shout about clients who won’t manage this, it is 
nevertheless what’s going to happen so we’re looking at new ways of delivering advice 
through, for instance, emails, social media.’  Other measures included ‘developing better on 
line information to help people to self help or so that people come to face to face interviews 
better equipped to understand their problems and the caseworker’s advice’ and ‘putting a 
couple of pcs in waiting rooms so that people can look up their problem before they’re seen.’ 
(Law Centre)  
 
A recurring theme however was that many clients would be unable to manage this 
technology and in any event needed face to face advice: ‘I used to run a telephone line for 
Gingerbread, and every day we’d get people who, after a 40 minute interview, you would 
have to advise to go to a Law Centre, because on both an emotional and intellectual level 
dealing with it themselves was impossible.’  However, as this speaker went on to explain, the 
                                                 
25 Again the Coalition policy builds on the  model of responsibilization developed by New Labour,.  It is a policy which is encapsulated in  Susskind’s 
proposals to enhance access to justice: ‘citizens themselves must be appropriately empowered, so they can take care of some legal affairs on their own and 
work more productively with those who advise them …’.    
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need for face to face advice was frequently also due to the (often hidden)   complexity of a 
client’s situation: ‘It was often where you had these clusters of problems, and people’s failure 
to take action early on, as identified by the LSRC research – so maybe someone coming in 
with an eviction letter, who, it would emerge, had complex levels of debt, which could in turn 
link to an employment issue.’   
 
This speaker, reiterating concerns expressed above about New Labour’s construction of 
‘a ‘model’ client’, spoke of the idea of someone   ‘who is computer literate, with a mobile, 
able to understand advice, access information...’   As she went on to say: ‘Most clients aren’t 
like that’  In particular, advisors who worked with especially vulnerable groups like asylum 
seekers, identified how their own clients’ characteristics differed from this ‘ideal’ profile: 
‘many of our clients aren’t literate at all, especially those who are most vulnerable, and even 
those who are, may not have access to IT’; and again, ‘many of our clients – English is their 
second language, they may have mental health problems, and their problems do cluster’.  The 
following comments sum up the majority view:  
‘face to face advice rather than a telephone line or website is necessary because 
someone with a lot of complex poverty-related issues isn’t just an ordinary person 
without money - they’re in a completely different place not only economically and 
socially but also emotionally.  The model of the standard client is someone with  
reasonable understanding who has problems around the margins of their life, whereas 
for some of our clients, it’s the whole of their lives which is the problem, and they need 
a high level of advice, and repeat advice.’  
 
The implications of the needs of such clients meant that, as the manager of a small 
agency said, ‘areas such as welfare benefits have never paid for themselves because they 
involve very vulnerable individuals at a particular stage of their lives when you’re talking 
about little amounts of money as far as, say, a solicitor is concerned.  That kind of work I 
don’t think can ever be done under the profit motive, it’s never passed the sufficient benefit 
test spending two hours on a case which is worth £50 or £100 – you can’t make the business 
case for it’.  His subsequent remarks underline the devaluation of socially vulnerable groups 
and their problems entailed in the marketisation of legal services: ‘so certain aspects of advice 
I don’t think will ever stand up to a cold business analysis but will stand up to a value based 
analysis where you’re saying that people have a right to access to welfare benefits, to live, to 
be able to meet certain basic needs of food and shelter when they’re unemployed, sick or 
disabled .. and I don’t think you can square that circle in terms of the business case .’. 
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In a similar fashion to this reference to fundamental rights, another respondent framed 
this question in terms of the wider contribution to the law which the sector made: ‘what we 
bring is about strategy and interpreting the law and that’s based on knowing what tends to 
happen at tribunals, how they tend to treat different parts of the regulations’.  The data 
indicated that reduction of this legal work to the ‘provision of leaflets’ was further 
undermining the morale of a sector which New Labour policies had already demoralised.  
 
Morale and the crisis of sustainability  
All respondents agreed that the consequence of LASPO would be a crisis of 
sustainability for specialist advice, with a likely consequence of redundancies and a 
correspondingly  increased reliance on volunteers.  As noted above, the impact  of economies 
of scale was more intense among smaller and more local agencies (exactly those which would 
appear most readily to match the template for the Big Society). The umbrella agencies pointed 
to the fact that several of their small members had already closed; one predicted:  ‘what will 
be left will be the CAB, relying on volunteers’.  However, while volunteers were often seen in 
the rhetoric associated with the Big Society as a cost-free resource, managers stressed the 
very considerable costs associated with their training and supervision:  ‘the ratio of paid staff 
to volunteers is high because you need to check the quality and accuracy of the work that’s 
being done.’ Excessive reliance on volunteers also undermined the sector’s capacity to 
compete with private business because: ‘you cannot demand fixed hours, you often find a 
situation where a bureau empties around 3pm as they all go to pick up their children’. Many 
respondents also identified high levels of ‘churn’ amongst volunteers, which not only 
produced instability, but increased both training costs and the need for supervision. This 
represented a major challenge for smaller agencies with strong reputations in specialist areas 
which produced large numbers of word-of-mouth referrals, creating a demand which could no 
longer be met. 
 
The pressure created by the inability to meet demand is illustrated by the account by 
the manager of an immigration, nationality and asylum centre, which was struggling both 
financially and ethically with the withdrawal from scope of immigration work: ‘when people 
come to reception we have to find out whether it’s asylum or immigration, and if it’s an 
immigration matter we have to tell them we can’t help them – which is terrible – it’s very 
stressful and distressing – there is also a rising level of abuse because people are desperate’. 
Other respondents spoke of their offices having to close their doors during normal office 
opening hours; one said: ‘In terms of the direct impact on our day to day work, it is also 
making open door sessions more difficult to manage.  The agency nearby has reported that 
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arguments are breaking out in the waiting rooms because people are desperate to see an 
adviser.  And obviously that makes working conditions more difficult.’ 
 
 All foresaw demand increasing as a result of the huge savings being sought in the 
welfare bill by 2015.  The range and complexity of welfare reforms such as Universal Credit, 
and the reductions in Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) workforce were seen as 
particularly likely to increase both the extent of poverty and vulnerability and also faulty 
determinations by administrative bodies, and  hence  the need for expert advice. Respondents 
argued too that the absence of specialist advisers to pursue challenges to faulty determinations 
would result in failures to clarify ambiguous areas of the law.   There was therefore also deep 
concern about the intervention of the private sector. 
 
The true face of the market: unregulated private providers 
Managers and front-line workers expressed anxiety about the way in which they 
believed the ‘advice gap’ might be filled.  Firstly, they argued that what DiMaggio and 
Powell refer to as ‘institutional isomorphism’ would lead to the telephone gateway taking on 
the form of a mass call-centre, even if it was not actually run by one, with a reduction both in 
the potential to undertake effective triage, and also the exclusion of many complex public 
interest cases where the nature of the problem might require sophisticated interviewing of the 
client.  Secondly, citing the fact that one in five families in financial difficulty fall back on  
loan sharks,  it was felt that the scarcity of publicly funded advice would open the way for the 
less scrupulous private sector operators like claims management companies, and debt advice 
companies with links to pay-day lending firms, to enter the field: ‘where properly funded 
advice disappears, more opportunities for the private sector such as claims management 
companies, debt advice companies, including those who engage in sharp practice such as loan 
sharks.  It’s already happening, especially in debt’. Similarly, the manager of an asylum 
and immigration advice service pointed to the likely resurgence of many unscrupulous 
organizations and individuals who had given immigration advice a bad reputation at the turn 
of the century: ‘all of these cuts have of course encouraged the crooks.  We know there is a 
lot of that out there because when we give advice of course we find out their history, and a lot 
of them have already spent money on useless advice.’ 
 
Conclusion: 
We should be wary of generalising too broadly on the basis of a piece of qualitative 
research into a sector as varied and complex as the NFP advice sector.  This is not least 
because the element of competition introduced by best-value tendering has accentuated pre-
existing differences in function, scale and ethos, and in many cases crystallised these into 
 23 
differences of interest.  Larger scale organizations have achieved a competitive advantage in 
the field through economies of scale and a capacity to introduce managerialist internal 
reforms on a scale inaccessible to smaller and more localised agencies.  These reforms have 
also produced a degree of internal differentiation of ethos in some agencies, with some core 
values and practices key to front line advisers’ commitment eroded by the drive for 
efficiency. So the policy group of an umbrella organization described some agencies as 
‘culturally compliant’ and others (especially most Law Centres) as ‘culturally pugnacious’, 
and identified in particular one of the largest national advice organization as standing out ‘as 
having a very different feel, actually, a different culture’, and, further, how within agencies 
‘… you get the people who are fearful and in a way don’t want to break the rules or don’t 
want to get into trouble’. 
 
Our aim has been to draw on the varied responses to provide a narrative of the NFP 
sector’s experience of  its changing relationship with government, which reflects the 
complexity of the field.  We were concerned with the impact of the funding cuts generally, in 
particular of LASPO, and to place these experiences in the theoretical frame of the critique of 
the discourses of  entrepreneurialism and responsibilization, noting how these have succeeded 
in progressively shifting responsibility for poverty away from the state and towards citizens 
and recipients of welfare themselves, and how this has entailed capture or colonisation of the 
sector.  The data seems to us to reflect the way in which all agencies have been subject to 
incorporation in what we have argued is the culmination of 30 years discourse and policy,  
namely a business culture, based on the responsible consumer client. We would now like to 
conclude this narrative by exploring how participants in the sector have construed the broader 
political framing of welfare and legal aid reform as a project to reverse the post-war model of 
social citizenship or ‘de-modernise’ Britain (Harvey 2007). 
 
Central to this project is precisely the removal of the capacity to challenge executive 
decisions, implicit not only in legal aid reform, but also the rhetorical assault on judicial 
review. This analysis echoes Brown’s (2006) argument that neo-liberalism seeks to produce 
the ‘undemocratic’ citizen:  one respondent said ‘it may also be that they don’t want people to 
be challenging government’, and another described government strategy as ‘part of a general 
weakening of civil rights and liberties.  For instance you have the proposed changes in 
employment rights so that a worker has no rights against, for example, unfair dismissal before 
they have worked for that employer for two years’.  He went on  
‘The suspicion has to be that there’s a deliberate policy behind all this to cut down on 
the number of appeals against benefits decisions.  Because of course specialist advice 
on welfare benefits makes it possible to challenge incorrect decisions and a cynic might 
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argue that this is a government seeking to reduce evidence of embarrassing problems.  
You could also argue that it’s part of a general weakening of civil rights and liberties.’  
And, pointing to the replacement of the EHRC advice line by an information only 
telephone service, he argued: ‘All in all it does feel like it’s a multi pronged attack on 
human rights – especially when one considers that the Tories have made it quite clear 
that they don’t like the HRA.’   
 
This interpretation is supported in LCF Annual Report 2011 ‘Weathering the Storm’ 
which speaks of the gathering strength anti Human Rights discourse, the attacks on equality 
legislation and on the EHRC.   This was the kind of context that respondents saw as 
exacerbating their anxieties and the future capacity, quality and ethos of the sector: ‘This 
government doesn’t seem to be interested in the quality agenda at all.  If you remove all the 
specialists so that advice is ‘Big Society’, delivered by volunteers, then it’s even more 
important than now to have independent and clear quality thresholds – otherwise you’re 
creating an advice sector which isn’t knowledgeable’. Events were interpreted by others as 
‘an ideological attack on the sector’, and that the government aim was ultimately to get rid of 
both the sector and its clients: ‘the emphasis is to take out the demand side of things – the new 
logic is that if we remove the funding schemes the demand will dissipate and in some areas 
advice agencies will just go’ A similar reflection was made in connection with the 
introduction of a ‘gateway telephone line - it’s not just a help line, it’s a mechanism for 
restricting access to justice – it’s deliberately designed to limit the number of people coming 
through.’  The reforms would therefore represent simultaneously a diminution of the idea of 
entitlement alongside a practical restriction on the capacity to realise those entitlements that 
remained. 
 
Yet the Coalition government continues to proclaim its commitment to access to 
justice:  “Access to justice is a hallmark of a civilised society. Legal aid is an essential tool in 
achieving equality of access for members of society who cannot afford legal advice and 
representation.” (MOJ 2010) However, this statement can be read as simply illustrative of 
how in liberal democracies, particularly those where the law is thoroughly imbricated into 
everyday life,  the provision of access to justice represents a key element in government 
claims to legitimacy (Held 1995).   The question remains as to whether this rhetoric is 
credible in the face of policies that will, in spite of the claims that they are ‘empowering’, 
marginalise the poor, not merely reducing their access to public goods and the legal means to 
enforce their access to them, but convert them into ‘flawed consumers’ (Bauman 1998) and 
hence lesser citizens. 
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